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In Canada many changes have been made, and more are pending, to their grain transportation policies.
This package of policy changes has two offsetting impacts on freight rates for Canadian grain producers.
The removal of transportation subsidies on grain for export offshore has roughly doubled the cost of
transporting grain for the Canadian producer. In addition, the change in pooling points will increase
freight rates even more for producers in the eastern part of the prairies. Whether federally owned grain
hopper cars are sold to the railways, or to an association of Canadian producers, the cost of the sale is
likely to be born by producers through increased freight rates over a number of years. In addition,
Canadian producers will bear the cost of investing in new cars, a cost that was previously born by the
government. The combined impact of all of these changes is to more than double freight rates for
producers in the western part of the Prairies, with larger freight rate increases for eastern Prairie
producers.
A number of other policy changes including rail line abandonment and car allocation procedures, and
the privatization of CN railway, are likely to increase the responsiveness and efficiency of the rail
system, and to reduce freight costs over the medium to long run. Changes in the elevator system, port
privatization and the construction of high throughput country and terminal elevators are likely to increase
the efficiency of the grain handling system. In addition, if the correct incentives for investment in grain
hopper cars are adopted, it is possible that the shortage of hopper cars that has occurred in the past might
be eased, further increasing the efficiency of the delivery system.
The increased cost of exporting to offshore markets has increased the economic incentive for Canadian
producers and grain companies to export to the U.S. market.  However, due to control of exports by the
Canadian Wheat Board, and their concern over the political consequences of large flows of grain to the
U.S., those exports may not occur.
The uncertainty surrounding the Wheat Board’s actions may make it difficult for grain handling
companies to anticipate trade flows and make adjustments to the infrastructure in the United States
needed to accommodate increased grain flows.
The large increase in freight rates occurred when grain prices were at high levels, dampening the impact
of increased freight rates on Canadian producers. If all other factors remain equal, increased costs of that
size are likely to result in a shift in the production patterns on the Prairies. The extent of adjustment will
depend on the production alternatives facing Prairie producers. The large increase in freight rates prompted Canadian transportation specialists to re-examine the
feasibility of transshipment of Canadian grain through U.S. ports.  Shipping Prairie grain through Pacific
North West ports was not found to be cost effective at this time.  While the cost of shipping through the
Gulf was found to be comparable to shipping through Canadian ports, institutional constraints are likely
to prevent substantial transshipment.
Some policy changes are likely to increase the viability of the Canadian rail transportation and handling
and reduce the cost of shipping over time. However, it seems unlikely that these efficiency
improvements will fully offset the large increase in transportation costs that Canadian grain producers
have just experienced. This means that the increased economic incentive for some Canadian producers
to ship to the U.S. market, compared to offshore markets, is likely to remain.Table of Contents
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Canadian grain transportation policies are in a period of rapid change. The
removal of government subsidies for grain transportation on August 1,
1995 has increased the cost to Canadian producers of shipping grain to
offshore export position. At the same time, the location of pooling points
was changed, further altering freight rates. The removal of transportation
subsidies in Canada could impact U.S. producers, particularly those close
to the border, due to the increased economic incentive to export to the U.S.
market. Policy changes that have not yet been resolved include grain
railcar ownership and allocation procedures. Over the long run, these and
other policy changes may increase the efficiency of the Canadian rail
system, and slightly moderate the impact of the recent increase in freight
rates.
This report discusses a wide range of changes that are occurring in
Canadian grain marketing and transportation. Part One describes the
removal of transportation subsidies and the change in pooling points,
which have recently increased freight rates for Canadian grain exports.
Studies that estimate changes in trade flows due to these policy changes
are reviewed. The institutional arrangements controlling Canadian exports
of wheat and barley and the implications for the U.S. market are discussed.
Part Two reviews the multitude of other policy changes that have either
recently been implemented, or that are being debated, that are likely to
affect the efficiency of the Canadian transportation system. Possible long
run implications for the United States are discussed.
The Canadian Grain Marketing System
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is the sole seller of all Prairie wheat
and barley that is exported, or that is sold for human consumption in
Canada. This includes wheat grown in the provinces of Saskatchewan,
Manitoba and Alberta, and the Peace River Area of British Columbia.
Grains under the control of the CWB will be referred to as “board grains.”
The domestic feed market, while influenced by Board activities, is not
under its direct control. Specialty crops such as canola and flax are not
under control of the Board and are marketed by private grain companies.
Key aspects of the Canadian grain marketing system for board grains are
price pooling, grain quality control, and extensive government regulation  Page 2 Canadian Grains Report    
In Canada,
maximum freight
rates for grain are
set by the
government.
of the transportation of grain. Producers deliver their grain to a pool, which
is simply an account for a particular grade of wheat or barley. Revenues
from marketing grain and CWB costs are accounted for in these pools.
Currently the Board operates four pools—for amber durum wheat,
ordinary wheat, feed barley and designated (malting) barley. Producers
receive an initial and final payment for grain delivered to the pool, and
when prices are higher than expected, an interim payment as well. The
initial payment is guaranteed by the Canadian Federal Government. One
stated goal of this system is to pool the risk associated with seasonal price
fluctuations, infrastructure constraints and marketing costs.
Canada has a stringent system of varietal control for wheat and barley. Only
permitted varieties can be received as milling grade wheat by Canadian
grain elevators. Regulations concerning varietal control effectively limit
U.S. access to the Canadian grain handling and marketing system. Permitted
varieties are required to be visually distinguishable, meaning that they can
be identified by sight. The Canadian Grain Commission is responsible for
setting quality standards for Canadian grain and for approving the licensing
of new varieties. The Commission is also responsible for the regulation of
grain elevators, and in the past, for the setting of maximum tariff rates for
grain elevators.
The Canadian Railway System
In Canada there are two railways, Canadian Pacific and Canadian
National. Until November of 1995, Canadian National was owned by the
Government of Canada. At that time it was sold to private investors, and
is now a privately run company. A stipulation of sale was that maximum
ownership shares were limited to fifteen percent to guard against anti-
competitive behavior. 
Canada has 15,248 miles of basic network lines including 6,100 miles of
grain dependent branch line. Rail rates are regulated by the Canada
Transportation Agency. Maximum freight rates are based on cost estimates
and are adjusted for inflation. Freight rates were not increased due to
inflation in 1994 and 1995, partially due to the removal of transportation
subsidies. Consequently there was a significant increase on August 1,
1996. For a typical movement of 1,026 to 1,050 miles the rate will climb
to CA$34.09 per ton from CA$31.82 a ton.





Part Two: Recent Changes in Canadian
 Freight Rates
The Incentive for Canadian Grain Exports to the United States
The relative returns for Canadian grain producers of sales to the United
States versus offshore markets is determined by both the prices in those
markets and the cost of transporting grain to the delivery point. In Canada,
two recent policy changes have substantially increased the cost of
transporting grain to offshore export markets. In this section, changes in
transportation policies and the resulting increase in freight rates are
discussed, and two studies that estimate changes in trade flows due to the
policy changes are reviewed.
Removal of the Transportation Subsidies
On August 1, 1995 the Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) was
eliminated, ending a long history of transportation subsidies by the
Canadian Federal Government to Prairie grain producers. Under the
WGTA the shipper only had to pay a portion, roughly half, of the cost of
moving grain to offshore export position, and the government paid the rest
(Figure 1). The subsidy was given to a long list of grains and grain
products including wheat, barley and specialty crops. Appendix One
contains a detailed list of the commodities that were eligible for
transportation subsidies. 
Under the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement, the transportation subsidy
was not given on grain exports to the United States. It was, however, given
on grain shipped to Thunder Bay, and some of this grain was then routed
back to the United States. The total value of the transportation subsidy was
estimated at CA$560.6
2 million in the 1994/95 crop year. The elimination
of the WGTA will increase the freight rates paid by all Prairie producers
on the export of grain to offshore markets. On average, the cost of
shipping grain for the producer will roughly double, from CA$15 to
CA$30 per metric ton. For an average length of haul of 1026-1050 miles,
the producer must now pay a freight rate of CA$31.82/metric ton. The
largest cost increases will occur in locations farthest from the ports, with
producers in the Peace River area of British Columbia and Alberta
generally having a smaller increase in freight rates.
The federal government is providing a one time payment of CA$1.6 billion
to compensate prairie producers for the loss of the subsidy. An additional
CA$300 million is being provided over three years as adjustment
assistance.  Page 4 Canadian Grains Report    
Figure 1. WGTA Freight Rates





  Source: Grain Transportation Agency. (1994). “Moving Canada’s Grain:
A Digest of Key Facts.” Winnipeg, Manitoba.
Change in Pooling Points
In Canada, board grains are sold in pools, as discussed on page one.
Producers receive an initial payment when they deliver grain to the
elevator. A freight charge based on their distance from the closest pooling
point is deducted from their payment. Beginning with the 1995/96 crop
year, the pooling points have been changed from Vancouver and Thunder
Bay to Vancouver and the Lower St. Lawrence (Figure 2). Historically,
grain exported from the east and west coasts had a similar value, and
roughly equal amounts were shipped from each coast. Over time, a larger
percentage was marketed from the west coast resulting in a subsidization
of the grain moving through the Seaway. 
The change in pooling points is being phased in over three years, and the
line that divides the westward and eastward movement of grain will shift
east each year. For crop year 1995/96 the line dividing the catchment basin
for the Lower St. Lawrence was Reford, Saskatchewan. It is expected to
move eastwards to Grenfell, Saskatchewan and then to Brandon or Virden
in Manitoba over the next two years. As cost of transporting grain throughCanadian Grains Report  Page 5  






the Seaway is shifted to producers east of the dividing line, their
transportation costs are expected to increase, depending on their location.
3
The federal government has set aside CA$105 million to provide
assistance to producers facing higher transportation costs due to the
change in pooling points, including CA$45 million for the 1995/96 crop
year. For some producers, including those in the provinces of British
Columbia and Alberta, the change in the eastern pooling point from
Thunder Bay to the Lower St. Lawrence means they will no longer be
subsidizing transportation costs for producers in the eastern Prairies. Table
1 shows freight rates for representative locations in the Prairie provinces.
Estimates of the Change in Canadian Exports to the United States
There are few publicly available studies that assess the likely change in
Canadian grain exports to the U.S. due to increased freight rates for
offshore exports. Two studies are described below.
The Producer Panel Report
The Canadian report was prepared by members of the Producer Payment
Panel, an appointed panel with representation from industry,  Page 6 Canadian Grains Report    
The freight deduction
for grain shipped from
Saskatchewan is
between CA$30-36.
Table 1.  1995/96 Producer Freight Deductions
Freight Deductions














































































































































































         Source: Canadian Wheat Board. Grain Matters. July-August 1995, pg. 3.Canadian Grains Report  Page 7  




Canadian grain to the




4 The panel was asked by the federal
government to broadly assess the consequences of removing the WGTA.
One part of this evaluation contains an analysis using a Canadian model,
the CRAM model, that includes estimates of exports of grain to the
United States. Three different scenarios are analyzed and the results are
summarized in Table 2.
Scenario One: A baseline scenario without major Canadian policy
changes that shows the model’s predicted exports from Canada to the
United States in the year 1999/2000. It assumes restrictions on flows to
the U.S. based on the level of exports in 1992/93.
Scenario Two: Assumes that Canada can export to the United States
without volume controls. This scenario does not contain Canadian policy
changes.
Scenario Three: In this scenario transportation subsidies to offshore
export markets are removed and the eastern pooling point is changed
from Thunder Bay to the Lower St. Lawrence. No restrictions are placed
on exports to the United States.
Table 2. Estimated Export Shipments to the United States from
 Western Canada
000's tonnes Scenario One Scenario Two Scenario Three
Wheat 1436 2085 3047
Feed Barley 113 224 330
Malt Barley 62 50 65
Oats 477 624 1001
    Source: Producer Payment Panel. (1994). “Delivering the Western Grain
Transportation Act Benefit to Producers: Technical Appendix,”
June, pg. 46.
Exports of wheat, feed and malting barley and oats to the United States
have already been larger than exports predicted in Scenario Two, which
has unconstrained exports without Canadian policy changes. (The
Producer Panel Report was published in 1994, and it is likely that the
analysis was performed in 1993.) The reasons for these larger than
anticipated exports are discussed on page 10. However, this analysis
clearly shows that larger flows of grain are expected to the United States
due to these two policy changes.   Page 8 Canadian Grains Report    
Exports of Canadian
wheat and barley to
the U.S. are controlled
by the Canadian
Wheat Board.
Study by Johnson and Wilson
Professors Johnson and Wilson analyze the consequences for barley trade
flows of the removal of the WGTA.
5 They use a mathematical
programming model to analyze the North American barley market, based
on average barley supplies for the years 1989/92.
Base scenario: Their baseline assumes no quantitative trade restrictions,
import tariffs on feed barely of $1 per ton, and the use of export subsidies
on U.S. malting and feed barley through the Export Enhancement
Program. This results in exports of barley from Canada to the U.S. of 1.6
million metric tons of barley.
Removal of the WGTA: With the removal of the WGTA, and all other
assumptions constant (including the use of export subsidies by the United
States) exports from Canada to the United States increase to 3 million
metric tons, almost twice the predicted level of exports before the
removal of Canadian transportation subsidies.
The authors state that predicted trade flows with the removal of the
WGTA are likely to be somewhat overestimated. This is because their
model does not capture the decrease in production of barley expected in
Canada due to increased transportation costs. 
It is important to note that Johnson and Wilson’s analysis is based on the
assumption that the U.S. is using export subsides for barley. The likely
impact of U.S. export subsidies for grain on Canadian–U.S. trade flows
is discussed in Box 2.
In another article, Wilson, Johnson and Dahl state that opportunities for
cross border arbitrage will be heavily influenced by changes in
transportation rates. They argue that if existing rail subsidies in Canada
are eliminated (or replaced by direct producer payments) there will be
enormous pressure to sell Canadian grain into the U.S. market.
6
Conclusions
There are a limited number of publicly available studies that provide
estimates of the impact of the removal the WGTA. The two reviewed
here both conclude that Canadian exports of wheat and barley to the
United States would increase substantially with the removal of
transportation subsidies if no other barriers to trade existed. 
Institutional Arrangements for Canadian Grain Exports
Even with increased profitability of the U.S. market relative to offshore




grain into the U.S.
market.
not occur. This is due to the structure of the Canadian grain marketing
system, in particular, the role and power of the Canadian Wheat Board.
All exports of wheat and barley are controlled by the CWB, including
exports by either individual producers or grain companies to the United
States. Canadian producers can “buy back” their grain from the Wheat
Board at the local elevator for amounts up to 1,000 tons, and, acting as
an accredited exporter of the Board, sell it to buyers in the U.S. market.
The CWB sets a daily buy back price, also called the truck price, for this
transaction. The Board states that the buy back price is based on the
Minneapolis price, adjusted for currency differences and basis. Sales by
individual Canadian producers into the U.S. market are a small
percentage of total sales to the U.S. market. Sales by Canadian grain
companies are much more significant, and the price and quantity of the
each sale must be approved by the Board. 
Producer Sales
Due to lack of publicly available data, I have not been able to analyze the
relationship between the buy back price and the Minneapolis price in
order to verify the relationship between the two. Given the political
friction that has existed over exports of Canadian grain into the U.S.
market, the Board may be motivated by political concerns to set the buy
back price to limit sales to the U.S. 
In Box One there is an example of the economic factors that must be
considered by Canadian producers in their decision about whether to sell
to the Board or to the U.S. market. Loyns and Kraut
7 give an example of
the relative profitability of the two markets for durum. While the
example is only illustrative, Loyns and Kraut argue that the Board sets
the buy back price high enough that the U.S. and Canadian markets do
not arbitrage. In this case, arbitrage means that trade occurs to the point
where prices differ only by transportation costs. They conclude that U.S.
producers should be pleased to have the CWB holding back sales in this
way.
The buy back system has also been analyzed by Wilson, Johnson and
Dahl who state that “Through the buy back mechanism the Wheat Board
allows some amount of cross border arbitrage by Canadian producers
(i.e., capturing price premiums in selected U.S. markets) while retaining
considerable leverage over the overall trade volume.”
8
CWB Direct and Approved Sales
As the sole marketer of Canadian grain, the CWB coordinates the
domestic and international marketing of Canadian grain. The Board
states that it provides higher returns for Canadian producers by its ability
to discriminate between markets, and to extract premium prices  Page 10 Canadian Grains Report    
In 1994 Canadian
wheat imports were
3.8% of the amount
of U.S. wheat
production.
in some markets. However, these markets are a relatively small
proportion of the world market, and around 80 percent of world markets
are classified as price sensitive bulk markets for wheat.
9 This means that
while there is some ability to price discriminate in world grain markets,
it is likely to be limited. The CWB will chose to sell to the United States
when it offers higher returns than other markets, if political concerns are
not a factor. 
Conclusions
The Canadian Wheat Board controls all sales of wheat and barley to the
United States. Market observers have speculated that the Board feels
some political pressure to control exports to the United States at levels
equal to or below the amount imported between September 12, 1994
through September 14, 1995, when a “Memorandum of Understanding”
between the United States and Canada resulted in a tariff rate quota
restricting imports of wheat into the United States.
10 A recent report by
Canadian transportation specialists observed that, “In theory, the borders
are now again free, but restrictions are likely to continue because of fears
of U.S. retaliation if there should be a resumption of the heavy
movements that occurred immediately before the truce.”
11 The buy back
price, and control over sales by grain companies, allow the Wheat Board
to determine the level of exports to the United States.
Implications for Montana Producers
The purpose of this section is to assess the impact of imports on the U.S.
market price. In order to do this, it is first necessary to consider the level
of imports, and how prices are set in the U.S. grains market. 
Past U.S. Imports of Canadian Grain
U.S. imports of wheat and barley from Canada have increased
significantly in the past ten years, but have been quite variable. As shown
in Table 3, in 1991 imports of wheat were around half a million tons.
They reached a high of 2.4 million metric tons in 1994, due to a
combination of weather factors that produced a short fall of feed grains
in the U.S. and an abundance of feed wheat in Canada. In 1995 imports
were much lower, in part due to the implementation of the
“Memorandum of Understanding” discussed above.
Despite the recent increase in grain imports from Canada, the level of
imports has been quite small compared to the size of the U.S. market.
This is illustrated in Figure 3 for wheat. In 1994 Canadian wheat imports
were only 3.8 percent of the wheat produced in the U.S.Table 3.  U.S. Imports of Wheat, Wheat Flour and Barley from Canada (metric tons)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Wheat




































































































Subtotal 405,480 440,678 575,319 1,941,484 1,036,681
      Source: Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA  Page 12 Canadian Grains Report    
The Canadian Wheat
Board estimates that
2 million metric tons of
wheat will be exported to
the U.S. in 2004/2005.
Figure 3 . U.S. Wheat Production and Canadian Wheat Imports
Sources: Foreign Agricultural Service. Grain: World Markets and
Trade. USDA. March 1996; Grain and Feed Division,
Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA.
Estimated Future Canadian Grain Imports
Estimates of U.S. imports of Canadian grain are presented in Table 4.
These estimates are taken from a recent report by the Transport Institute
at the University of Manitoba.
11 The Canadian Wheat Board estimates that
2 million metric tons of Canadian wheat will be exported to the U.S. in the
year 2004/2005, a higher estimate than that made by the Transport
Institute.
Impact of Imports on the U.S. Wheat Price
Economists have presented different estimates of the impact of imports
on the U.S. wheat market price. Two estimates of the impact of imports
on U.S. wheat prices are presented below, the reasons why they differ are
discussed. These estimates can be usefully viewed as giving a range of
the potential price impact of wheat imports.
Production is on a marketing year basis and imports are on a calendar year basis.Canadian Grains Report  Page 13  
Economists differ in
their estimates of the
decrease in the U.S.
wheat price due to
Canadian imports.
Table 4.  Exports of Major Canadian Grains from Prairie Elevators
Average Estimates
1992/1995 1996/1997 1999/2000 2004/2005
Wheat 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2
Durum 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
Barley 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Canola 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Oats, Rye, Flax 0.3 1.0 1.2 1.3
Total 2.3 3.4 3.6 4.0
Source: Transport Institute, (1996 . “Future Changes in Eastbound Grain Traffic.”
The International Institute for Sustainable Development, The University
of Manitoba, pg. 77.
Marsh and Johnson
Marsh and Johnson
12 estimated the relationship between stocks and U.S.
farm prices of wheat. Their econometric model investigated the statistical
relationship between the level of stocks and the season average wheat
price. Marsh and Johnson contend that:
“Such a relationship, at first, can appear to be quite naive because a
multitude of economic and political factors can affect world grain
markets. However, many of the variables that impact grain markets (i.e.,
incomes, production costs, interest rates, etc.) can eventually change
stock or inventory levels.” 
They estimate that a one time increase in stocks of ten percent for a
single year will decrease the price of wheat by four percent in the next
year, and by nearly ten percent after three years.  
Marsh and Johnson discuss the impact of imports of Canadian wheat on
the U.S. market price. If U.S. exports increased by the same amount as
the imports, then it could be concluded that U.S. wheat had replaced
Canadian wheat in the export market. However, to conclude that this was
the case it would be necessary to assess changes in the level of domestic
production and consumption. 
They observe that there was an increase in U.S. stocks of eight percent
for the 1993/94 crop year, and of that the portion due to Canadian exports
was estimated at 0.15 percent (less than two tenths of one percent). Using
their regression results, Marsh and Johnson estimate that this resulted in
at most a 1.5 to 2 cent drop in the national average price of wheat.  Page 14 Canadian Grains Report    
The largest estimate is
that Canadian imports
in 1993/1994 resulted
in at most a 1.5 to 2
cent/bushel drop In the
national average price
of wheat.
Alston, Gray and Sumner 
13
Alston, Gray and Sumner investigated the impact of Canadian grain
imports on the U.S. market using a simulation model of the U.S.,
Canadian and world market for durum, milling wheat and feed wheat.
Their model explicitly includes production and consumption of these
three types of wheat. Their base scenario has milling wheat production
in the U.S. of 207.4 million bushels of milling wheat, imports of milling
wheat from Canada of 2.5 million metric tons of all classes of wheat and
a U.S. market price of U.S.$2.97 bushel. Reducing imports by half, or by
1.25 million tons resulted in an increase in the market price of only half
a cent a bushel, and further reduction of imports to only .625 million
metric tons resulted in an increase in the market price of less than one
cent.
These results suggest that the price responsiveness of the U.S. market
to an increase in imports is very small. Their simulation model uses
elasticities of supply and demand that are large in comparison with those
used in other studies. This means that a small change in price will result
in a rather large change in the amount supplied by U.S. producers, or
demanded by U.S. consumers for milling, feed or durum wheat. These
adjustments in supply and demand, and the high degree of substitution
among types of wheat for different uses and by different suppliers,
moderate the impact of imports and result in small changes in price.
Price Determination in the Grains Market
The world price of individual grain is used to allocate the grain between
competing uses in the world market. In national markets, policies may
influence the amount of grain that is produced and consumed. Policies
that affect the consumer price, in conjunction with the fundamental
forces behind demand, such as population, income and preferences, will
determine demand in a country. Production is also influenced both by
national policies and by fundamental forces such as production costs and
alternatives. Policies influencing production may include producer
prices, credit subsidies and the like. Trade policies, including tariffs,
tariff rate quotas, and quotas may be used to separate national markets
from the world market.  
The amount of grain supplied to and demanded from the world market
will determine the world price. Prices for grain may vary between
individual markets due to differences in the quality of grain demanded.
As markets are separated by transportation costs, to a certain extent
prices may also differ due to the ability of sellers of grain to price
discriminate between markets. The ability of buyers of grain to exert






the U.S. by raising
U.S. grain prices.
The U.S. and Canada are both heavily reliant on the world grains
market. Between 1990 and 1995 the U.S. exported an average of
53 percent of the wheat that it produced. In contrast, Canada is much
more dependent on world markets, with wheat exports averaging 73
percent of its production over the same time span. 
The total market for feed grains in the United States is extremely large,
with the production of coarse grain for the 1995/96 crop year forecast at
207 million metric tons. This point is important for assessing the impact
of Canadian grain imports.
At this time, in the United States the world price of grain determines
the domestic price of grain. Price quotes at U.S. ports are adjusted for
transportation costs and are the basis for price quotes at country grain
elevators. In the past U.S. policies have at times separated U.S. market
prices from world prices. For example, this occurred due to the loan rates
for wheat which kept U.S. prices above world prices. It has been argued
that the Export Enhancement Program raised U.S. prices above world
prices and that this was an incentive for Canadian exports to the U.S.
market. This issue is discussed in detail in Box Two. While the Export
Enhancement Program has been authorized until the year 2002, due to
high grain prices on world markets it has not been used since July 1995.
For the 1995/96 crop year no policies are in place that significantly
separate U.S. market prices from world prices.  
Conclusions
In comparison to the size of the total U.S. market, imports of Canadian
wheat are relatively small, being less than four percent of U.S.
production in 1994. Empirical studies of the impact of Canadian imports
on U.S. market prices conclude that the effect was small. Estimates
reviewed here range from less than one to two cents per bushel.
Impact of Imports on Hi-Line Producers and Grain Handlers 
The previous discussion indicates that the impact of imports of Canadian
wheat on the U.S. market has been minimal. However, it is also
important to consider the economic impact on local communities. In
Montana the area most affected by imports was the “Hi-Line,” the
portion of Montana that directly borders Canada. This is where most of
the Canadian imports were delivered to U.S. elevators.
Price Impact
The first question to be considered is whether or not there was a decrease
in the price of grain at Montana elevators due to the imports. In general,
grain elevators set their offer prices in relation to the price at U.S. ports,
minus the cost of transportation. The graph in Figure 4 shows the lowest
posted asking price for elevators in four different locations in  Page 16 Canadian Grains Report    
Figure 4. Posted Offer Prices at Selected Elevators in
Montana and Portland, January-May 1994
Elevator congestion
due to import surges
has an economic cost
for producers in the
Hi-Line.
Montana,
14and the posted offer price in Portland
15 for the period of the
largest imports of grain from Canada. If the cost of transporting grain
was constant over that period, then there should be a constant margin
between these elevator prices and the prices at ports in the Pacific
Northwest, which is the destination for around sixty percent of
Montana’s grain. The price for grain at Portland for the same period is
shown in the graph in a dotted line. This data indicates that surges of
imports of Canadian grain did not result in large price fluctuations at the
elevators in the Hi-Line, in North central or Northeastern Montana. The
margin that separates these prices from the Portland price appears
relatively constant and reflects transportation costs.
Non Price Effects
Producers in the Hi-Line stated that they were unable to deliver their
grain to elevators during the surge of the imports from Canada in 1994.
The economic consequences of this inconvenience depend on:
& the level of on farm storage that the producer has available to store
his grain for delivery at a later time and,
& how pressing the cash flow needs of the producer are, which will
determine whether or not the producer can afford to wait to deliver.
While some economic impact was felt by producers in the Hi-Line, there
is little evidence that prices were significantly lower due to imports.Canadian Grains Report  Page 17  
The structure of the
Canadian grain
marketing system
makes it difficult to
anticipate how much
grain is likely to be
exported from Canada
to the United States.
However, producers who were unable to deliver to elevators incurred a
storage cost from waiting to deliver, or increased costs from transporting
their grain to a more distant location.
Conclusions
The cost of shipping to the offshore export markets has increased
suddenly and substantially in Canada. This has changed the relative
profitability of the U.S. market compared to offshore markets for
Canadian producers and grain companies. At the same time, the U.S. has
discontinued the use of the Export Enhancement Program. By raising
U.S. prices above world market levels, the EEP is thought to have been
partially responsible for Canadian spring wheat exports to the United
States.
Even if Canadian producers and grain companies might find the U.S.
market attractive, exports to the United States are strictly controlled by
the Canadian Wheat Board. It is possible that the Wheat Board has
limited sales to the U.S. market for political reasons. However, data is
not available to test this hypothesis.
The structure of the Canadian grain marketing system makes it difficult
to anticipate the how much grain is likely to be exported from Canada to
the United States. The construction of new grain handling facilities along
the border indicates that some adjustment in infrastructure is occurring.
However, uncertainty over the future actions of the Wheat Board, and
thus trade flows, may be impeding the ability of the grain handling sector
to make needed adjustments.
Part Three: Other Transportation and
Handling Policy Changes
Introduction
In the past, Canada’s grain handling and transportation system has been
extensively regulated. Maximum freight rates are set by the government.
Many government policies, such as car allocation procedures, have
reduced competition between grain companies. As a consequence, some
economists argue that handling charges have been largely passed through
to producers.
16 At this time many policy changes are occurring that will
reduce the amount of government regulation and increase the market
orientation of the railways and the grain handling system. Over time,
these changes may increase the efficiency and lower the costs of handling
and transporting grain. However, certain aspects of Canada’s grain
policies, such as the mandatory cleaning of grain for export, and the
quality control system for grain are not under review. Continuing these
policies will continue to keep handling and transportation costs higher
than they might be otherwise.  Page 18 Canadian Grains Report    
Maximum freight rates
for grain will be set by
the government until
at least 1999.
There are a number of recent and pending changes to Canada’s
transportation policies. Major changes were made with the passage of the
Canada Transportation Act on July 1, 1996. Another set of policy
recommendations were made in the Senior Executive Officer’s Report
(SEO Report). This report was written by a group of industry and
government officials who were asked to make recommendations on rail
car ownership and abandonment. Some of these recommendations were
adopted in the recent budget act.
Railways
Freight Rates: More Changes
Under the recently passed Canada Transportation Act, the government
will continue to set maximum freight rates until at least the year
1999/2000, when the continuation of maximum freight rates will be
reviewed. Freight rates will be adjusted for inflation and for increases in
productivity. Beginning August 1, 1998, the benefit of future increases
in productivity will be shared as follows: the railways realize the benefit
of the first half of a percent and subsequent productivity increases being
shared by producers, shippers and the railways. Until 1999 freight rates
will continue to be regulated by the government and increases will
be limited to increases in inflation or costs, and subject to
government approval.
Rail Line Abandonment
In Canada there are 6,000 miles of grain dependent branch lines.
Previously it was extremely difficult for railways to abandon branch
lines, leading to the maintenance of branch lines considered uneconomic
by the railways. It has been estimated that the elimination of 1,400 miles
of branch line would provide a cost savings to the railways of CA$25
million to CA$30 million a year.
The “Robson Process” was initiated in 1994 to facilitate rail line
abandonment on a one time basis. In this process 535 miles of branch
lines have been identified as economically feasible to be abandoned, for
a saving of an annual CA$14 million.
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In a significant shift in policy, new abandonment procedures were
implemented on July 1, 1996. That made it much easier for railways to
abandon branch lines. CN railway announced that it would abandon
2,361 kilometers of branch lines in the Prairies.
18 As the productivity
sharing plan described above will not start until 1998, the railways will
realize the entire benefit of the cost reduction associated with branch line








Railcar Allocation and Ownership
There are roughly 18,850 dedicated grain hopper cars owned by the
government in Canada. Of these the federal government owns 15,000, the
Canadian Wheat Board owns 2,000 and the Provincial governments of
Alberta and Saskatchewan each own 1,000. In the past the federal
government bought the grain hopper cars and provided them to the
railways at no cost. The former Grain Transportation Agency estimates
that this subsidy was worth an estimated CA$2.90 per tonne.
19 The
Government of Canada has announced that it will sell its entire fleet of
grain hopper cars during 1996, and the future ownership and the sales
price of these cars is in question. Producer groups, the railways, and the
Wheat Board, have all expressed a desire to own the grain hopper cars.
Regardless of how the car ownership question is settled, grain shippers
are expected to pay an additional CA$0.75 per ton in freight rates to
compensate the buyer for the purchase cost.
Another policy that is in the midst of being changed is the system of
railcar allocation. Previously, railcars were assigned to grain companies
through a complicated allocation procedure that was administered by the
Grain Transportation Office (GTO). The CWB has played important role
in this process. The legislation that abolished the Western Grain
Transportation Act also abolished the GTO and established the Western
Grain Transportation Office. Despite the change of the name of the
office, procedures have remained relatively constant, as recommenda-
tions for a new allocation system are being developed and studied. The
SEO report recommends that the Western Grain Transportation Office
be abandoned and that a Car Allocation Policy Group be created to
develop guidelines regarding car allocation. They advise that the CWB’s
role be minimized and that allocation procedures move to a “commercial
basis,” although the meaning and implications of that wording are
unclear. 
Changes in car ownership and allocation procedures are important
because the government is reducing its role, and that of the Wheat Board,
in the transportation of grain. 
Ports
Port Privatization
The Canadian Minister of Transportation has announced a new National
Marine Policy that would free major commercial ports from the control
of the federal government.
20 This legislation would change the status of
these ports from crown agencies to not-for-profit corporations. It is
anticipated that freedom from federal regulations will increase the
efficiency and the profitability of the ports.   Page 20 Canadian Grains Report    
Consolidation of
county grain elevators
is expected to continue
and increase.
In addition, the Government of Canada is evaluating the privatization of
the operation of the Canadian portion of the St. Lawrence Seaway.
21
Port and Route Parity
Previously, due to a policy of port and route parity, equal rates were
charged on the transportation of grain from Edmonton to Vancouver and
Prince Rupert. This was done despite the fact that the distance to Prince
Rupert is 184 miles longer from Edmonton than Vancouver. Also, freight
costs from Calgary and Edmonton to Vancouver were equal, and this
policy also has been eliminated. Port parity and route parity have been
abolished as a part of an effort to increase the market orientation of the
Canadian rail system, and should eventually lead to more efficient




Rapid change is also occurring in the size, function and location of
country grain elevators. In the past, both the procedures used to allocate
cars and the maintenance of grain dependent branch lines are thought to
have impeded the process of abandoning smaller grain elevators for
larger and more efficient elevators.
Grain Elevation Tariffs
Prior to August 1, 1995 the Canadian Grain Commission set maximum
tariffs for country, transfer and terminal elevators. These maximum
tariffs applied only to Board grains, with the tariffs for non board grain
being set without regulation. Grain companies could set their tariffs to be
less than or equal to the regulated maximum rate. Since that date the
Canadian Grain Commission no longer sets maximum rates.
23 Grain
companies are only obligated to inform the Commission of the maximum
rate that they charge. Since deregulation there has been little change in
tariff rates.
24 Some country elevators are now charging on a gross, rather
than a net basis, which increases the cost to producers by the amount of
the dockage.
Trends in the Size and Location of Grain Elevators
In 1995 there were 1340 licensed primary elevators, 14 transfer elevators,
and 18 terminal elevators in Canada.
25 The number of country elevators
has declined rapidly in recent years, decreasing by 32 percent in the
eleven years preceding 1995/96, while the capacity has declined by only
18 percent (Table 5). The province of Manitoba has experienced less
concentration of its country grain elevators, having a decrease of only
23 percent of its elevators over this time. Canadian Grains Report  Page 21  
Inland cleaning of
grain and “direct hit”
shipments are
expected to increase.
The consolidation of country elevators is expected to continue, and
increase, due to the policy changes discussed here. In the past, both the
inability of railways to abandon branch lines, and the procedures used by
the CWB to allocate cars, are thought to have maintained smaller and
more costly elevators.
The Manitoba Pool, a farmer owned cooperative which owns fifty
percent of the elevators in the province of Manitoba, has announced that
it will close at least one third of its 130 elevators in the next three years.
This would leave it with just 80 elevators by 1998. The Cooperative has
stated that elevators that did not handle at least 15,000 tons in 1996
would be closed.
26 
Several new grain elevators are planned or are under construction.
Cargill and the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool have announced that they will
build a high throughput ocean terminal at Roberts Bank, British
Colombia.
27 
Table 5. Canadian Grain
Number of County Elevators
*
Crop Year Number Capacity (metric tonnes)
1962/63 5,226 10,290,640 
1983/84 2,800 8,035,480 
1984/85 1,967 8,005,720 
1995/96 1,340 6,563,630 
Note: Effective the 1984/85 crop year the Canadian Grain Commission allowed
operators of primary elevators to house two or more adjacent facilities, which
were under the control of a single manager, as a single primary elevator. This
change accounts for most of the large drop in elevator numbers between 1984/85
and 1995/96.
*Source: Canadian Grain Commission (1996). “Grain Elevators in Canada: Crop
 Year 1995/1996,” Winnipeg, Manitoba.
Many of the high throughput elevators which are under construction or
in the planning stages will have the capacity to clean Canadian grain to
export standards. The incentive to clean grain before it is shipped to
export terminals has been increased by the removal of the transportation
subsidies, as the cost of transporting dockage has increased. Increased
transportation costs is also one motivation for a trend of more livestock
feeding on the Prairies, which increases the demand for dockage.  Page 22 Canadian Grains Report    
Inland cleaning of
grain and “direct hit”
shipments are
expected to increase.
Table 6.  Estimated Rates for Western Canadian Grain Exports
























       
   *assuming CA$1 = US$0.74
The movement to inland cleaning is anticipated to have several conse-
quences; it should reduce the cost of transporting grain as the dockage
will no longer be shipped to port. While other factors may limit the flow
of Canadian grain through U.S. export facilities, inland cleaning will
eliminate one of the current constraints. Inland cleaning is also expected
to have an impact on the development of the port facilities in Canada.
The function of elevators at ports could be reduced to that of a transfer
facility.
Some Canadian elevators are attempting to develop the concept of
“direct hit” shipments on grain.
11 This is when export ready grain is
assembled on the prairies and unit trains are dispatched in anticipation
of the arrival of a specific vessel in port.  While the implementation of
this concept is more advanced for specialty crops, it is an indication of
how grain shipping might progress.
Evaluation of Transhipment of Canadian Grain for Export
 Through the United States
Due to the substantial increase in freight rates in Canada, it is appropriate
to evaluate if transhipment of Canadian grain for export through the
States is a viable option.  A recent study compares the cost of shipping
through U.S. Pacific Northwest ports and through U.S. Gulf ports with
the cost of shipping through Canadian ports.
11Canadian Grains Report  Page 23  
It is unlikely that much





U.S. Pacific Coast Ports
While several Pacific ports have the capacity to handle increased
shipments of grain, the cost of this route for Prairie grain is much higher
than shipment through Vancouver. This conclusion held for Prairie grain
from several representative locations, as shown in Table 6. The cost
difference is due both to higher distances and the rates currently charged
for captive grain by BN railroad.
U.S. Gulf Ports
For shipment of Canadian grain through U.S. Gulf ports, the cost of
Rosetown to Quebec was compared to the cost of shipping to New
Orleans.  These figures are shown in Table 7.  While the report finds that
a rail barge combination to New Orleans is competitive with export
through Quebec, the report expresses a cautionary note.  The authors
argue that barge rates are extremely volatile and that rates should be
expected to increase with an increase in demand.  In addition, as the rates
do not reflect the full cost of maintaining the waterway, they recognize
that large shipments of Canadian grain through the waterway would be
a subsidy to Canadian exports that they do not expect would continue
very long.
Table 7.  Estimated Rates for Eastern Canadian Grain Exports
(CA$/tonne
*)
Rosetown to Quebec City









*Assuming CA$1 = US$0.74
The costs evaluated only consist of transportation costs and do not
include adjustments for the additional cost of maintaining the identity of
Canadian grain, or of inspecting it at U.S. ports. These measures are
necessary to meet Canadian grain regulations which are designed to
market Canadian grain as a distinct product.  In addition, Canadian grain
must be cleaned to their export standards before shipment overseas.
While some grain is now cleaned at inland terminals, the transition is not
complete and poses an additional institutional constraint.
Given the cost of exporting through U.S. ports and the continuing
institutional constraints that would have to be overcome, it is not likely  Page 24 Canadian Grains Report    
that much transhipment of Canadian grain through U.S. ports will occur
at present U.S. rail rates even though Canadian rail rates have roughly
doubled.
Summary
Table 8 summarizes key characteristics of the Canadian grain handling
and transportation system, what potential changes are being considered
and their potential impact on handling and transportation costs.
Table 8.  Policy Changes and Impacts
Current Policy Potential Change Potential Impact
Railcar Alloca-
tion




no price incentives in
the allocation process 
Railcar Owner-
ship
sale from government to
either the railways or
producer groups
producers will bear


















elimination of policy increase efficiency











Canadian transportation specialists recently estimated that increases in
rail productivity could contribute to a substantial decrease in freight rates
over the long run.






increased by 3 percent annually, on average, over the past three decades.
Future productivity gains are likely to accrue from a decreased branch
line system, an increase in the use of high throughput elevators, a larger
number of car loadings at each origin and other changes.  They estimate
this would reduce rates from CA$31.82/t for an average haul of 1026-
1050 miles to CA$21.30 in the year 2004/05 (this cost is estimated in
1995 dollars).
%QPENWUKQPUCPF+ORNKECVKQPU
The package of policy changes occurring in Canada at this time have two
offsetting impacts on freight rates for Canadian grain producers. 
& The removal of transportation subsidies on grain for export offshore
has roughly doubled the cost of transporting grain for the Canadian
producer. In addition, the change in pooling points will increase
freight rates even more for producers in the eastern part of the
prairies. Whether the grain hopper cars are sold to the railways, or to
an association of Canadian producers, the cost of the sale is likely to
be born by producers through increased freight rates over a number
of years. In addition, Canadian producers will bear the cost of
investing in new cars, a cost that was previously born by the
government. The combined impact of all of these changes is to more
than double freight rates for producers in the western part of the
Prairies, with larger freight rate increases for eastern Prairie produc-
ers.
& A number of other policy changes including rail line abandonment
and car allocation procedures, and the privatization of CN railway,
are likely to increase the responsiveness and efficiency of the rail
system, and to reduce freight costs over the medium to long run.
Changes in the elevator system, port privatization and the construc-
tion of high throughput country and terminal elevators are likely to
increase the efficiency of the grain handling system. In addition, if
the correct incentives for investment in grain hopper cars are
adopted, it is possible that the shortage of hopper cars that has
occurred in the past might be eased, further increasing the efficiency
of the delivery system.
While the economic incentive for increased exports to the U.S. market
currently exists, as previously discussed, control of exports by the Wheat
Board means that these sales may not occur. The uncertainty surrounding
the Wheat Board’s actions may make it difficult for grain handling
companies to anticipate trade flows and make adjustments to the
infrastructure in the United States needed to accommodate increased
grain flows.  Page 26 Canadian Grains Report    
The large increase in freight rates occurred when grain prices were at
high levels, dampening the impact of increased freight rates on Canadian
producers. If all other factors remain equal, increased costs of that size
are likely to result in a shift in the production patterns on the Prairies.
Forthcoming research will discuss estimates of the shift in production
that may occur. The extent of adjustment will depend on the production
alternatives facing Prairie producers. 
The policy changes, discussed in Part III of this report, are likely to
increase the viability of the Canadian rail transportation and handling
system. Inland cleaning could remove one constraint of several currently
limiting shipping Canadian grain through the U.S. grain handling system.
However, it seems unlikely that these efficiency improvements, with
associated cost decreases, will fully offset the large increase in transpor-
tation costs that Canadian grain producers have just experienced. This
means that the increased economic incentive for some Canadian
producers to ship to the U.S. market, compared to offshore markets, is
likely to remain even if efficiency increases over time. Box 1. How the Canadian Wheat Board “Buy Back” System Works
Example of Durum Wheat, Winnipeg Location, January 1995
(in CA$)
Producer Opportunity Cost Buy-Back
Initial Payment (TB) $160.00
At Winnipeg $140.00 Producer Pays $165.00  
Final Payment $ 67.00 Trucking (estimate) $20.00  
(Forecast from PRO)
Total $207.00 Producer Direct Costs $185.00  
(At Winnipeg) Producer Sells $329.00
*
Margin $144.00  
Final Payment $ 67.00  
Total $211.00
**
  *Assumed U.S. price $6.50 @ 1.38 exchange rate.
**The $4 gain is highly sensitive to exchange rate, trucking cost and producer selling price.
The producer brings grain to the elevator and, if under 1,000 tons, the buy back price applies.
The producer compares the guaranteed return—his opportunity cost from the initial and
estimated final payment—with what he can earn from a sale directly into the U.S. market. His
expenses—buying the grain back at $165 and trucking it for $20, total $185. His revenue is $329
from the U.S. buyer and $67 as his share of the pool’s final payment. In this case, returns from
selling to the Board or to the U.S. are extremely close. To be more profitable than selling to the
pool, the producer must capture a higher price in the U.S., or have lower transportation costs,
than estimated by the Board.
Source: Loyns, R.M.A. and Maurice Kraut. (1995). “Pricing to Value in the Canadian Grains Industry.”
Canada-United States Joint commission on Grains, Final Report, Volume II, pg. 33.* Gray and Gardener, Wilson and Johnson
Box 2.  The Impact of the Export Enhancement Program on U.S. Imports of Canadian Grain
The Export Enhancement Program (EEP) is an export subsidy program that was begun in 1985
with the goal of countering export subsidies for wheat used by the European Union. In this
program subsidies are given to companies exporting grain in order to lower the cost for selected
importers. The EEP has been used extensively since 1985. However, it has not been used since
July 1995 due to high world prices in the grains market.
Many market observers and academics
* have argued that the Export Enhancement Program
(EEP) created a wedge between U.S. and world wheat prices, and that high U.S. prices were
partly responsible for the surge in Canadian grain imports. The underlying idea is that an export
subsidy program will increase demand for U.S. wheat in the world market. This will increase
the price in the U.S. grains market, which will increase supply of wheat by U.S. producers and
reduce the demand by U.S. consumers. Imports from Canada occurred partially due to the fact
that U.S. prices were somewhat higher than world prices, while no significant import barriers
limited the flow of Canadian wheat.
This is a characterization of the EEP after 1991 when the number of countries receiving export
subsides increased and cash subsidies were given instead of in kind subsidies. Before that year,
the EEP gave in kind subsidies, meaning that stocks were used to provide the subsidy to a
relatively few targeted importers. Gray and Gardner
28 argue that the release of stocks in this
fashion was likely to decrease prices in the U.S. as well as the countries importing wheat.
However, beginning in 1992, the EEP was operated more like a simple cash subsidy and the
number of importers receiving the subsidy increased. It is also important that other exporters
sold wheat on the same terms as the United States through the EEP. Gray and Gardner conclude
that after 1990 the EEP did play a role in U.S. imports of Canadian grain.
They state, “On the other hand, price relationships for spring wheat other than
durum suggest that the EEP did increase the U.S. relative to the Canadian
market price.”
29
They estimate that the EEP might be responsible for around 50 percent of the exports after 1991.
However, they state that further econometric work is necessary to be confident of the magnitude of
impact of the EEP.
Wilson and Johnson
30 use a spatial model of U.S. and Canadian barley trade to analyze the
impact of the EEP on imports of Canadian barley. Their results indicate that imports of barley
from Canada increase with the size of the bonus given under the EEP program. For example,
imports increase from 0.52 to 1.50 million metric tons with the introduction of a $40/ton export
subsidy for the U.S., and imports increase further to 1.78 million metric tons when the subsidy
is raised to $60/ton.Canadian Grains Report  Page 29  
Appendix One
Schedule of Grains and Grain Products that were Eligible for WGTA Support
Schedule 1 (Sections 2 and 64) Grains, Crops and Products






Beans (except soybeans) including faba beans,
splits and screenings
Beans (excepts soybean) derivatives (flour, pro-
tein, isolates, fibre)
Bran
Breakfast Foods or Cereals (uncooked) in bags,
barrels or cases. Manufactured from com-





Feed, Animal or Poultry (not medicated or 
condimental), containing not more than
35 percent of ingredients other than com-
modities as specified in this Schedule, in
bags or barrels or in bulk.
Flaxseed
Flour, made from grain or malt in bags or
barrels or in bulk
Grain, Feed, in sacks
Groats
Hulls, Oat
Lentils, including splits and screenings




Meal, Rapeseed or Canola
Meal, Oil Cake, Linseed
Meal, Oil Cake, Rapeseed or Canola










Oil Cake, Rapeseed or Canola
Oil Cake, Sunflower Seed
Peas, including splits and screening
Pea derivatives (flour, protein, isolates, fibre)
Rapeseed or Canola
Rye
Screenings or Screenings pellets (applicable
only on Screenings from grains speci-
fied herein)







Source: Canada, Western Grain Transportation Act. Chap. W-8, 1984.  Page 30 Canadian Grains Report    
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